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Third, social inequalities and consumption differentials, although visible in the previous regime, are
now much more pronounced. One of the first acts of the new government was to decree salaries for
ministers and top government officials upwards to $5,000 monthly, paid in stable foreign currency.
This is more than 100 times higher than the minimum wage. In contrast, the top salary for a minister
of state in the previous government was about triple the average worker's wage. These social
distinctions are accentuated at a time when impoverishment of the majority has reached levels
never before seen in Nicaragua. "Dollarization" of the economy has turned Nicaragua into one
of the most expensive countries in the world. Official unemployment has surpassed 40%, real
wages have dropped 50%, the minimum wage is below $50 per month, and hunger and disease are
spreading throughout both rural and urban areas. Fourth, although both governments stressed
export promotion through devaluations and other incentives, the former also pursued policies
(low-cost credit, guaranteed prices, etc.) that allowed for continued economic participation of
producers tied to the domestic market (e.g., the campesino sector, and small- and medium-scale
urban producers). In its effort to maintain the export sector's profitability, the UNO authorities
have designed credit, price, fiscal and exchange policies which threaten to ruin domestic producers
and thus undermine the livelihood of broad layers of the population. Fifth, the new government
is promoting privatization of industry and services, with the stated aim of increasing efficiency.
This has sparked fears among workers and small proprietors that it will lead to a reconcentration
of urban wealth among those with capital. In the countryside, privatization involves reversing
important aspects of the Sandinista agrarian reform and a reconcentration of control over land,
which is generating tensions between peasant farmers and cooperatives on the one hand, and large
producers and agro-exporters, on the other. In sum, all agree that the bitter medicine of austerity is
necessary. But the Sandinista government managed to distribute the costs of economic adjustment
among different classes and sectors in ways which contained social tensions. On the other hand, the
logic of the UNO government's policies is to place the burden on public and formal sector salary
earners and the domestic market in order to favor exporters and large-scale producers. This logic,
whether or not it is sound in terms of economic efficiency, carries with it a distinctive class bias
in favor of the rich and large-scale producers. Unless they are achieved through negotiation and
consensus, such redefinitions of social priorities are bound to trigger protest from those whose
incomes and living conditions are negatively affected. Wither Concertacion? President Chamorro
was quite candid in her address to the opening forum on concertacion: "Mechanisms have not
yet been discovered for eliminating inflation and restructuring the economy without causing
unemployment and recession...There is poverty, epidemics, malnutrition, illiteracy and lack of
services. We are not fooling ourselves into thinking that everything is perfect." She added that the
government's goal is to reach agreements that permit a reduction of the social and economic costs
of stabilization. The Sandinistas retorted that a reduction of costs is not enough; negotiation over
the stabilization plan itself is also necessary. "Dialogue only to approve the government plan is
suicide," commented Augusto Zamora, a legal advisor to the FNT. "Sitting down to discuss, revise
and readjust the plan sounds more reasonable. But if the government says its plan is not open to
discussion, then...the government to govern, the opposition to oppose and the unions to unionize."
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Neither side in Nicaragua conceives of concertacion as a means to resolve differences; they are
clear that it can only keep social and political conflict latent so that recovery will be possible.
Therefore, concertacion can only be achieved through mutual compromise and trade-offs. Whether
concertacion can succeed in averting the cycle of civil strife in war-torn Nicaragua is not clear. The
hope generated by the remarkably civilized government transition - the first in Nicaraguan history
- has been largely subsumed by the specter of prolonged instability. The electoral period has come
to a close, and the issue is no longer the transition, but the social and economic contours of society.
Creating a climate of confidence among the protagonists may be the first step, but frank recognition
by both sides that survival depends upon concertacion is the force that might ultimately drive both
to a modus vivendi.

-- End --
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